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Abstract
In this paper we consider a layered-security model in which the containers and their nestings
are given in the form of a rooted tree T . A cyber-security model is an ordered three-tuple
M = (T,C, P ) where C and P are multisets of penetration costs for the containers and target-
acquisition values for the prizes that are located within the containers, respectively, both of the
same cardinality as the set of the non-root vertices of T . The problem that we study is to assign
the penetration costs to the edges and the target-acquisition values to the vertices of the tree
T in such a way that minimizes the total prize that an attacker can acquire given a limited
budget. The attacker breaks into containers starting at the root of T and once a vertex has been
broken into, its children can be broken into by paying the associated penetration costs. The
attacker must deduct the corresponding penetration cost from the budget, as each new container
is broken into. For a given assignment of costs and target values we obtain a security system,
and we discuss three types of them: improved, good, and optimal. We show that in general it
is not possible to develop an optimal security system for a given cyber-security model M . We
define P- and C-models where the penetration costs and prizes, respectively, all have unit value.
We show that if T is a rooted tree such that any P- or C-model M = (T,C, P ) has an optimal
security system, then T is one of the following types: (i) a rooted path, (ii) a rooted star, (iii) a
rooted 3-caterpillar, or (iv) a rooted 4-spider. Conversely, if T is one of these four types of trees,
then we show that any P- or C-model M = (T,C, P ) does have an optimal security system.
Finally, we study a duality between P- and C-models that allows us to translate results for
P-models into corresponding results for C-models and vice versa. The results obtained give us
some mathematical insights into how layered-security defenses should be organized.
Keywords: cyber-security model, duality, graph minors, rooted tree, security system, system
attack, tree types, weighted rooted tree.
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1 Introduction
According to [6], the global cyber-security market cost in 2017 is expected to top 120 billion US
dollars. This site also reports that there are 18 victims of a cyber crime every single second!
Other sources report similarly alarming and worsening statistics. There is agreement that the
number of cyber attacks is increasing rapidly, and the consequences of such attacks are greater
than ever on economics, national security, and personal data. Threats come from nation states
with advanced cyber warfare commands, nation states having less technical capabilities but intent
on doing harm, ideologically motivated groups of hackers or extremists, profit-seeking criminals,
and others. Building on the work done in [3], in this paper we study a layered-security model
and strategies for assigning penetration costs and target-acquisition values so as to minimize the
amount of damage an attacker can do to a system. That is, we examine security systems. The
approach we take here is to assign weights to the vertices and edges of a tree in order to build
a cyber defense that minimizes the amount of prize an attacker can accumulate given a limited
budget. To the best of our knowledge this approach is new in that the usual approach is to consider
a particular weighted tree as input. For example, in [1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12] the authors consider finding
weight-constrained, maximum-density subtrees and similar structures given a fixed weighting of a
tree as part of the input. In these cases weights are specified on both vertices and edges.
There has been some research on network fortification and problems related to that topic. For
example, in [13] stochastic linear programming games are studied and it is demonstrated how these
can, among other things, model certain network fortifications. In [14] the problem of network
interdiction is studied—how to minimize the maximum amount of flow an adversary/enemy can
push through a given network from a source s to a sink t. There each edge/arc is provided with a
fixed integer capacity and an integer resource (required to delete the edge/arc). This is a variation
of the classical Max-Flow-Min-Cut Theorem. Although interesting in their own way, neither of
these papers or related papers that we have found in the literature address directly what we study
in this paper.
In [3] the authors posed the following question: Can one mathematically prove that the intuition
of storing high-value targets deeper in the system and having higher penetration costs on the outer-
most layers of the system results in the best or at least good security? In this paper we answer this
question and obtain more general and specific results. We define three types of security systems:
improved, good, and optimal. We show that not all cyber-security models admit optimal security
systems, but prove that paths and stars do. We define and study P- and C-models where all of
the penetration costs, and the prizes, are set to one, respectively. We classify the types of trees
that have optimal security systems for both P- and C-models. We then discuss a duality between
P- and C-models, which provides a dictionary to translate results for P-models into corresponding
results for C-models, and vice versa.
To build secure systems requires first principles of security. “In other words, we need a science
of cyber-security that puts the construction of secure systems onto a firm foundation by giving de-
velopers a body of laws for predicting the consequences of design and implementation choices” [11].
To this end Schneider called for more models and abstractions to study cyber security [11]. This
paper is a step in that direction. We hope that others will build on this work to develop even better
and more-realistic models, overcome the shortcomings of our model, as well as develop additional
foundational results.
The outline of this article is as follows. In section 2 we present the rationale for our layered-
security model. In Section 3 we define the framework for security systems and present the definitions
of improved, good, and optimal security systems, and state some related observations and examples.
In section 4 we explore optimal security systems and prove that they do not always exist, but show
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they exist if and only if T is either a path rooted at a leaf, or a star rooted at its center vertex.
In section 5 we define P- and C-models and show that any cyber-security model M = (T,C, P ) is
equivalent to both a P-modelM ′ and a C-modelM ′′. We further show that if T is a rooted tree such
that any P- or C-modelM has an optimal security system, then T is one of the following four types:
(i) a rooted path, (ii) a rooted star, (iii) a rooted 3-caterpillar, or (iv) a rooted 4-spider. In section 6
we prove that if T is one of the four types of rooted trees mentioned above, then any P-model does
indeed have an optimal security system. In section 7 we define a duality between equivalence classes
of P-models and equivalence classes of C-models that serves as a dictionary allowing us to obtain
equivalent results for C-models from those of the P-models that were obtained in section 6. In
particular, we obtain Theorem 7.20 that completely classifies which P- and which C-models have
optimal security systems. Conclusions and open problems are discussed in section 8.
2 Rationale for Our Layered-Security Model
In defining our layered-security model to study defensive cyber security, we need to strike a balance
between simplicity and utility. If the model is too simple, it will not be useful to provide insight
into real situations; if the model is too complex, it will be too cumbersome to apply, and we may
get bogged down in too many details. The model described in this paper is a step toward gaining
a better understanding of a broad range of security systems in a graph-theoretical setting for a
layered-security model.
Many systems contain layered security or what is commonly referred to as defense-in-depth,
where valuable assets are hidden behind many different layers or secured in numerous ways. For
example, a host-based defense might layer security by using tools such as signature-based vendor
anti-virus software, host-based systems security, host-based intrusion-prevention systems, host-
based firewalls, encryption, and restriction policies, whereas a network-based defense might provide
defense-in-depth by using items such as web proxies, intrusion-prevention systems, firewalls, router-
access control lists, encryption, and filters [9]. To break into such a system and steal a valuable
asset requires that several levels of security be penetrated, and, of course, there is an associated
cost to break into each level, for example, money spent, time used, or the punishment served for
getting caught.
Our model focuses on the layered aspect of security and is intended to capture the notion that
there is a cost associated with penetrating each additional level of a system and that attackers
have finite resources to utilize in a cyber attack. Defenders have the ability to secure targets using
defense mechanisms of various strengths and to secure targets in desired locations and levels. We
assume that the structure where targets will be stored; that is, the container nestings; is given as
part of the input in the form of a rooted tree. In this way we can study all possible structures at
a single time, as they can be captured in the definition of our problems. This methodology is as
opposed to having the defender actually construct a separate defense structure for each input.
For any specific instance of a problem, a defender of a system will obviously consider the exact
details of that system and design a layered-security approach to fit one’s actual system. Similarly,
a traveling salesman will be concerned about constructing a tour of his particular cities, not a tour
of any arbitrary set of cities with any arbitrary set of costs between pairs of cities. Nevertheless,
researchers have found it extremely helpful to consider a general framework in which to study
the Traveling Salesman Problem. And, in studying the general problem, insights have been
gained into all instances of the problem. Thus, we believe it is worthwhile to consider having a
fixed structure as part of our input, and this approach is not significantly different from that used
in complexity theory to study problems [5, 7].
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In this paper we focus on a static defense. We pose as an open problem the question of how to
create a defense and an attack strategy if the defender is allowed to move targets around dynamically
or redistribute a portion of a prize. We also consider the total prize as the sum of the individual
values of the targets collected although one could imagine using other or more-complex functions
of the target values to quantify the damage done by an attacker. Our defensive posture is formed
by assigning to the edges and vertices of the rooted tree in question the input-provided penetration
costs and target-acquisition values, respectively. We formalize the model, the notion of a security
system, and the concept of a system attack in the next section.
3 Cyber-Security Model and Security Systems
Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}, Q be the rational numbers, and Q+ be the non-negative rational numbers.
Definition 3.1. A cyber-security model (CSM) M is given by a three-tuple M = (T,C, P ), where
T is a directed tree rooted at r having n ∈ N non-root vertices, C is a multiset of penetration costs
c1, . . . , cn ∈ Q+, and P is a multiset of target-acquisition-values (or prizes for short) p1, . . . , pn ∈
Q+.
Throughout V (T ) = {r, u1, . . . , un}, where r is the designated root that indicates the start of
a system attack, and E(T ) = {e1, . . . , en} denotes the set of edges of T , where our labeling is such
that ui is always the head of the edge ei. The prize at the root is set to 0. The penetration costs
model the expense for breaking through a layer of security, and the target-acquisition-values model
the amount of prize one acquires for breaking through a given layer and exposing a target. The
penetration costs will be weights that are assigned to edges in the tree, and the target-acquisition-
values, or the prizes, are weights that will be assigned to vertices in the tree.
Sometimes we do not distinguish a target from its acquisition value/prize/reward nor a con-
tainer, which is a layer of security, from its penetration cost. Note that one can think of each edge
in the rooted tree as another container, and as one goes down a path in the tree, as penetrating
additional layers of security. We can assume that the number of containers and targets is the same.
Since if we have a container housing another container (and nothing else), we can just look at this
“double” container as a single container of penetration cost equal to the sum of the two nested
ones. Also, if a container includes many prizes, we can just lump them all into a single prize, which
is the sum of them all.
Recall that in a rooted tree T , each non-root vertex u ∈ V (T ) has exactly one parent, and that
we assume the edges of T are directed naturally away from the root r in such a way that each
non-root vertex has an in-degree of one. The root is located at level 0 of the tree. Level one of the
tree consists of the children of the root, and, in general, level i of the tree consists of the children
of those vertices at level i − 1 for i ≥ 1. We next present some key definitions about a CSM that
will allow us to study questions about security systems.
Definition 3.2. A security system (SS) with respect to a cyber-security model M = (T,C, P ) is
given by two bijections c : E(T ) → C and p : V (T ) \ {r} → P . We denote the security system by
(T, c, p).
A system attack (SA) in a security system (T, c, p) is given by a subtree τ of T that contains
the root r of T .
• The cost of a system attack τ with respect to a security system (T, c, p) is defined by
cst(τ, c, p) =
∑
e∈E(τ)
c(e).
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• The prize of a system attack τ with respect to a security system (T, c, p) is defined by
pr(τ, c, p) =
∑
u∈V (τ)
p(u).
• For a given budget B ∈ Q+ the maximum prize pr
⋆(B, c, p) with respect to B is defined by
pr⋆(B, c, p) := max{pr(τ, c, p) : for all system attacks τ ⊆ T, where cst(τ, c, p) ≤ B}.
A system attack τ whose prize is a maximum with respect to a given budget is called an
optimal attack.
The bijection c in Definition 3.2 specifies how difficult it is to break into the various containers,
and the bijection p specifies the prize associated with a given container. Note that for any SS
(T, c, p) we have cst(r, c, p) = 0 ≤ B ∈ Q+. When T = ({r},∅), then pr
⋆(B, c, p) = 0 for any
B ∈ Q+. When two bijections are given specifying a SS, we call the resulting weighted tree a
configuration of the CSM. Any configuration represents a defensive posture and hence the name
security system. Note that the CSM can be used to model any general security system and not just
cyber-security systems. We are interested in configurations that make it difficult for an attacker to
accumulate a large prize. It is natural to ask if a given defensive stance can be improved. Next we
introduce the notion of an improved security system that will help us to address this question.
Definition 3.3. Given a CSM M = (T,C, P ) and a SS (T, c, p), an improved security system
(improved SS) with respect to (T, c, p) is a SS (T, c′, p′) such that for any budget B ∈ Q+ we
have pr⋆(B, c′, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p), and there exists some budget B′ ∈ Q+ such that pr
⋆(B′, c′, p′) <
pr⋆(B′, c, p).
Definition 3.3 captures the idea of a better placement of prizes and/or penetration costs so that
an attacker cannot do as much damage. That is, in an improved SS one can never acquire a larger
overall maximum prize with respect to any budget B; and furthermore, there must be at least one
particular budget where the attacker actually does worse. Notice that there can be an improved
SS (T, c′, p′), where for some budget B ∈ Q+, there is a SA τ whose cost is less than or equal to
B for both SSs such that pr(τ, c′, p′) > pr(τ, c, p). In this case an attacker obtains a larger prize in
the improved SS; and, of course, this situation is undesirable and means a weaker defense against
this specific attack. We, however, are interested in improved SSs with respect to a given budget
rather than a particular SA. Since we have exactly n penetration costs and n prizes to assign, it is
difficult to imagine an improved SS for all but the most-restricted trees in which all SAs would be
improved in the sense just described. Next, we formalize the notion of an optimal security system.
Definition 3.4. Let M = (T,C, P ) be a given CSM. (i) For a budget B ∈ Q+, a SS (T, c, p) is
optimal w.r.t. B if there is no other SS (T, c′, p′) for M such that pr⋆(B, c′, p′) < pr⋆(B, c, p). (ii)
(T, c, p) is optimal if it is optimal w.r.t. any budget B ∈ Q+.
Notice that an optimal SS is not necessarily the best possible. We could define a critically
optimal security system to be one where for every single SA the SS was at least as good as all
others and for at least one better. And, in a different context, these SSs might be interesting.
However, in light of Theorem 4.2 in the following section, which shows that even an optimal SS
may not exist for a given CSM, we do not pursue critically optimal SSs further in this paper. By
Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 we clearly have the following.
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Observation 3.5. A SS (T, c, p) for a CSM M = (T,C, P ) is optimal if and only if no improved
SS for (T, c, p) exists.
We next introduce the concept of two closely-related configurations of a CSM, and this notion
will give us a way to relate SSs.
Definition 3.6. Given a CSM M = (T,C, P ), the two configurations (T, c, p), and (T, c′, p′) are
said to be neighbors if
1. there exists an edge (u, v) ∈ E(T ) such that
p′(v) = p(u)
p′(u) = p(v)
p′(w) = p(w), otherwise, or
2. there exist two edges (u, v), (v,w) ∈ E(T ) such that
c′((u, v)) = c((v,w))
c′((v,w)) = c((u, v))
c′((x, y)) = c((x, y)), otherwise.
The notion of neighboring configurations will be useful in developing algorithms for finding good
security systems, which we define next.
Definition 3.7. A good security system (good SS) is a SS (T, c, p) such that no neighboring
configuration results in an improved security system.
Given a SS (T, c, p) for a CSMM , a natural question to pose is whether a local change to the SS
can be made in order to strengthen the SS, that is, make the resulting SS improved. In a practical
setting one may not be able to redo the security of an entire system, but instead may be able to
make local changes.
Suppose (u, v) ∈ E(T ) where p(u) ≥ p(v), and let p′ be the prize assignment obtained from p by
swapping the prizes on u and v, that is p′(u) = p(v), p′(v) = p(u), and p′(w) = p(w) otherwise. If
now τ is any SA, then pr(τ, c, p′) = pr(τ, c, p) if either both u, v ∈ V (τ) or neither u nor v are vertices
of τ , or pr(τ, c, p′) ≤ pr(τ, c, p) if u ∈ V (τ) and v 6∈ V (τ). In either case pr(τ, c, p′) ≤ pr(τ, c, p) and
therefore we have for any budget B that
pr⋆(B, c, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p). (1)
Similarly, if (u, v), (v,w) ∈ E(T ) where c((u, v)) ≤ c((v,w)), let c′ be the cost assignment obtained
from c by swapping the costs on the incident edges (u, v) and (v,w) and leave all the other edge-
costs unchanged, that is c′((u, v)) = c((v,w)), c′((v,w)) = c((u, v)) and c′(e) = c(e) otherwise. If τ
is a SA, then clearly we always have pr(τ, c′, p) = pr(τ, c, p). Also, if either both (u, v), (v,w) ∈ E(τ)
or neither (u, v) nor (v,w) are edges in τ , then cst(τ, c′, p) = cst(τ, c, p), and if (u, v) ∈ E(τ) and
(v,w) 6∈ E(τ), then cst(τ, c′, p) ≥ cst(τ, c, p). In either case we have cst(τ, c′, p) ≥ cst(τ, c, p). Hence,
if B is any budget, then by mere definition we have that
pr⋆(B, c′, p) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p). (2)
By (1) and (2) we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.8. Let M = (T,C, P ) be a CSM. A SS given by (T, c, p) is a good SS if for all
(u, v), (v,w) ∈ E we have c((u, v)) ≥ c((v,w)) and for all non-root vertices u, v ∈ V (T ) with
(u, v) ∈ E(T ) we have p(u) ≤ p(v).
Note that Proposition 3.8 says that on any root to leaf path in T the penetration costs occur
in decreasing order and the prizes occur in increasing order.
From any configuration resulting from a SS (T, c, p) for a CSM, Proposition 3.8 gives a natural
O(n2) algorithm for computing a good SS by repeatedly moving to improved neighboring configu-
rations until no more such neighboring configurations exist. We can do better than this method by
first sorting the values in C and P using O(n log n) time, and then conducting a breath-first search
of T in O(n) time. We can then use the breath-first search level numbers to define bijections c and
p that meet the conditions of a good SS. We summarize in the following.
Observation 3.9. Given a CSM M = (T,C, P ), there is an O(n log n) algorithm for computing a
good SS for M .
If we could eliminate the sorting step, we would have a more efficient algorithm for obtaining a
good SS, or if we restricted ourselves to inputs that could be sorted in O(n) time. Also, notice that
a good SS has the heap property, if we ignore the root. However, in our case we cannot “chose”
the shape of the heap, but we must use the structure that is given to us as part of our input.
Suppose that our SS (T, c, p) for M satisfies a strict inequality p(u) > p(v) for some (u, v) ∈
E(T ), or that c((u, v)) < c((v,w)) for some incident edges (u, v), (v,w) ∈ E(T ). A natural question
is whether the prize and cost assignments p′ and c′ as in (1) and (2) will result in an improved SS
as in Definition 3.3. In Example 3.10 we will see that that is not the case.
Convention: Let Tp(ℓ) denote the rooted tree whose underlying graph is a path on 2ℓ + 1
vertices V (Tp(ℓ)) = {r, u1, . . . , u2ℓ} and directed edges
E(Tp(ℓ)) = {(r, u1), (r, u2), (u1, u3), (u2, u4), . . . , (u2ℓ−3, u2ℓ−1), (u2ℓ−2, u2ℓ)}
rooted at its center vertex. We label the edges by the same index as their heads: e1 = (r, u1),
e2 = (r, u2),..., e2ℓ−1 = (u2ℓ−3, u2ℓ−1), and e2ℓ = (u2ℓ−2, u2ℓ).
r
u1 u2
u3 u4
u5 u6
e1 e2
e3 e4
e5 e6
Tp(3)
Example 3.10.
Let (Tp(3), c, p) be a SS for a CSM M where
c(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6) := (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2), p(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6) := (10, 2, 10, 3, 10, 40),
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where the penetration costs and the prizes have been simultaneously assigned in the obvious way.
We see that for any budget B ∈ Q+ we have
pr⋆(B, c, p) =


10⌊B⌋ for 0 ≤ B < 4,
10⌊B⌋+ 5 for 4 ≤ B ≤ 7,
75 for 4 < B.
If now p′(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6) = (10, 3, 10, 2, 10, 40) is the prize assignment obtained from p by swap-
ping the prizes on the neighboring vertices u2 and u4, and c
′(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6) = (1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1)
be the edge-cost assignment obtained from c be swapping the costs of the incident edges e4 and e6,
then
pr⋆(B, c, p′) = pr⋆(B, c′, p) = pr⋆(B, c, p),
for any non-negative budget B ∈ Q+, showing that locally swapping either prize assignments on
adjacent vertices, or edge-costs on incident edges, does not necessarily improve the SS.
In Theorem 4.2 in section 4, we show that there are CSMs for which no optimal SS exists.
In such cases obtaining a locally optimal SS, as defined in Definition 3.7, may provide us with a
reasonable defensive posture. In section 4 we also show that optimal SSs exist for paths rooted at
one of their leaves and for stars rooted at their center vertices.
4 Optimal Security Systems
One of the most natural and important questions to consider for a given CSM M is whether an
optimal SS exists and if it does, what it would look like. Unfortunately, Theorem 4.2 shows that
there are small and simple CSMs for which no optimal SS exists. Still we would like to know for
what CSMs optimal SSs do exist, and, if possible, have a way to find these optimal SSs efficiently.
Corollary 4.4 and Theorem 4.6 show that optimal SSs exist for CSMs M = (T,C, P ) when T is a
path or a star, respectively. These theorems also yield O(n log n) algorithms for producing optimal
SSs in these cases. But, these results are not satisfying, as they are limited. In sections 5, 6, and 7
we study P- and C-models and completely characterize the types of trees that have optimal SSs.
We begin with a lemma showing that all optimal SSs must have the highest penetration costs
assigned to the edges involving the root and level-one vertices.
Lemma 4.1. Let M = (T,C, P ) be a CSM, where T rooted at r contains at least one non-root
vertex. Let V1 ⊆ T (V ) denote the level-one vertices of T , and let CL be the multiset of the largest
|V1| values in C. If an optimal (T, c, p) SS for M , exists, then c(e) ∈ CL for e ∈ {(r, v) | v ∈ V1}.
Proof. Suppose we have an optimal SS (T, c, p) that does not meet the conditions of the lemma.
Let cs 6∈ CL be the smallest penetration cost assigned by c to an edge between the root r and a
vertex vs ∈ V1, that is, c((r, vs)) = cs ≤ c((r, v)) for all v ∈ V1 − {vs}. Let es = (r, vs) and let el be
an edge not between the root and a level-one vertex where c(el) ∈ CL. We know that such an edge
exists because (T, c, p) does not meet the conditions of the lemma. To show that (T, c, p) cannot
be an optimal SS, we define a SS (T, c′, p) by letting c′(es) = c(el), c
′(el) = c(es), and c
′(e) = c(e)
otherwise. Notice that for the budget B = cs, we have pr
⋆(B, c, p) = p(vs) > 0 = pr
⋆(B, c′, p). This
fact contradicts that (T, c, p) is an optimal SS. ⊓⊔
If an optimal SS exists, Lemma 4.1 tells us something about its form. In the next theorem we
show that there are CSMs for which no optimal SS exists.
Theorem 4.2. There is a CSM M = (T,C, P ) for which no optimal security system exists.
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Proof. ConsiderM = (T, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}), where T is the tree given by V (T ) = {r, u1, u2, u3} and
E(T ) = {e1, e2, e3} where e1 = (r, u1), e2 = (r, u2), and e3 = (u1, u3). By Lemma 4.1 we know that
an optimal SS (T, c, p) has c(e3) = 1, and we can further assume that p(u3) = 3. By considering
the budget of B = 2, we can also assume the prize of the head of the edge of cost 2 to by 1.
Therefore, we have only two possible optimal SSs for M : (T, c, p) with c(e1, e2, e3) = (3, 2, 1) and
p(u1, u2, u3) = (2, 1, 3), or (T, c
′, p′) with c′(e1, e2, e3) = (2, 3, 1) and p
′(u1, u2, u3) = (1, 2, 3). Since
pr⋆(3, c, p) = 2 and pr⋆(3, c′, p′) = 4, we see that (T, c′, p′) is not optimal, and since pr⋆(4, c, p) = 5
and pr⋆(4, c′, p′) = 4, we see that (T, c, p) is not optimal either. Hence, no optimal SS for M exists.
⊓⊔
Although Theorem 4.2 showed that there are CSMs for which no optimal SS exists, we are
interested in finding out for which trees T optimal SSs do exist. We should point out that the
values of the weights in C and P also play an important role in whether or not an optimal SS exists
for a given tree. In the next theorem we show that an optimal SS exists for CSMs in which the
tree in the model is a path, and this result is independent of the values of the weights in C and P .
Consider a CSM M = (T,C,M) where T is a path rooted at a leaf, so
V (T ) = {u0, u1, . . . , un}, E(T ) = {e1, . . . , en}, (3)
where u0 = r and ei = (ui−1, ui), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For a SS (T, c, p) for M , then for
convenience let pi = p(ui) and ci = c(ei) for each i. If we have pi ≤ pi+1 and ci ≥ ci+1 for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} (so the prizes are ordered increasingly and the edge-costs decreasingly as
we go down the path from the root), then by Proposition 3.8 the SS (T, c, p) is a good SS as in
Definition 3.7. But, we can say slightly more here when T is a path, in terms of obtaining an
improved SS as in Definition 3.3.
Lemma 4.3. Let M = (T,C,M) be a CSM where T is a path with its vertices and edges labeled
as in (3).
(i) If (T, c, p) is a SS for M and there is an i with pi > pi+1 and ci+1 > 0, then the SS (T, c, p
′)
where p′ is obtained by swapping the prizes on ui and ui+1 is an improved SS.
(ii) If (T, c, p) is a SS for M and there is an i with ci < ci+1, then the SS (T, c
′, p) where c′ is
obtained by swapping the edges costs on ei and ei+1 is an improved SS.
Proof. By Proposition 3.8 we only need to show (i) there is a budget B′ such that pr⋆(B′, c, p′) <
pr⋆(B′, c, p) and (ii) a budget B′′ such that pr⋆(B′′, c′, p) < pr⋆(B′′, c, p). For each j let τj =
T [e1, . . . , ej ] be the rooted sub-path of T that contains the first j edges of T .
For B′ = c1 + · · ·+ ci we clearly have
pr⋆(B′, c, p′) = pr(τi, c, p
′) = p1 + · · · + pi−1 + pi+1 < p1 + · · · + pi = pr(τi, c, p) = pr
⋆(B′, c, p),
showing that (T, c, p′) is an improved SS for M .
Likewise, we have
pr⋆(B′, c′, p) = pr(τi−1, c
′, p) = p1 + · · ·+ pi−1 < p1 + · · ·+ pi = pr(τi, c, p) = pr
⋆(B′, c, p),
showing that (T, c′, p) is also an improved SS for M . ⊓⊔
Given any SS (T, c, p) for M as in Lemma 4.3 when T is a rooted path, by bubble sorting
the prizes and the edge costs increasingly and decreasingly respectively, as we go down the path
T from the root, we obtain by Lemma 4.3 a SS (T, c′, p′) such that for any budget B we have
pr⋆(B, c′, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p). We therefore have the following corollary.
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Corollary 4.4. If M = (T,C,M) is a CSM where T is a rooted path with its vertices and edges
labeled as in (3), then there is an optimal SS for M , and it is given by assigning the penetration costs
to the edges and the prizes to the vertices in a decreasing order and increasing order respectively
from the root.
We now show that an optimal SS exists forM = (T,C, P ) when T is a star. Let T be a star with
root r and non-root vertices u1, . . . , nn and edges ei = (r, ui) for i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose the costs
and prizes are given by C = {c1, . . . , cn} and P = {p1, . . . , pn}. When considering an arbitrary
security system (T, c, p) where c(ui) = ci and p(ei) = pi for each i, we can without loss of generality
assume the edge-costs to be in an increasing order c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose T is a star and (T, c, p) is a SS as above. If p′ is another prize assignment
obtained from p by swapping the prizes pi and pj where i < j and pi ≤ pj , then for any budget B
we have pr⋆(B, c, p) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p′).
Proof. Let B be a given budget and τ ⊆ T an optimal attack with respect to p, so pr(τ, c, p) =
pr⋆(B, c, p). We consider the following cases.
Case one: If both of ui and uj are in τ , or neither of them are, then pr
⋆(B, c, p) = pr(τ, c, p) =
pr(τ, c, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p′).
Case two: If ui ∈ V (τ) and uj 6∈ V (τ), then pr
⋆(B, c, p) = pr(τ, c, p) ≤ pr(τ, c, p) − pi + pj =
pr(τ, c, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p′).
Case three: If ui 6∈ V (τ) and uj ∈ V (τ), then τ
′ = (τ −uj)∪ ui is a rooted subtree of T with
c(τ ′) = c(τ)− cj + ci ≤ B and is therefore within the budget B. Hence, pr
⋆(B, c, p) = pr(τ, c, p) =
pr(τ ′, c, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p′).
Therefore, in all cases we have pr⋆(p, c,B) ≤ pr⋆(p′, c, B). ⊓⊔
Since any permutation is a composition of transpositions, we have the following theorem as a
corollary.
Theorem 4.6. Let M = (T,C, P ) be a CSM where T is a star rooted at its center vertex. Then
there is an optimal SS for M , and it is given by assigning the prizes to the vertices in the same
increasing order as the costs are assigned increasingly to the corresponding edges.
For rooted trees on n non-root vertices, Corollary 4.4 and Theorem 4.6 give rise to natural
sorting-based O(n log n) algorithms for computing optimal SSs. Notice that in an optimal SS in a
general tree, the smallest prize overall must be assigned to a level-one vertex u which has the largest
penetration cost assigned to its corresponding edge, (r, u), to the root. And, furthermore, we cannot
say more than this statement for arbitrary trees as the next assignment of a prize will depend on
the relative values of the penetration costs, prizes, and structure of the tree. In view of the fact
that optimal SSs do not exist, except for paths and stars as we will see shortly in Observation 5.1,
we turn our attention to restricted CSMs and classify them with respect to optimal SSs.
5 Specific Security Systems, P-Models, and C-Models
In this section we extend CSMs to include penetration costs and prizes of value zero. For a CSM
M = (T,C, P ) with no optimal SS and a rooted super-tree T † of which T is a rooted subtree, we
can always assign the prize of zero to the nodes in V (T †) \ V (T ) and likewise the penetration cost
of zero to the edges in E(T †) \E(T ), thereby obtaining a CSM M † = (T †, C†, E†) that also has no
optimal SS. Hence, by the example provided in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we have the following
observation.
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Observation 5.1. If T is a rooted tree, such that for any multisets C and P of penetration costs
and prizes, respectively, the CSM M = (T,C, P ) has an optimal SS, then T is either a path rooted
at one of its leaves, or a star rooted at its center vertex.
In light of Observation 5.1, we seek some natural restrictions on our CSMM that will guarantee
it having an optimal SS. Since both the penetration costs and the prizes of M = (T,C, P ) take
values in Q+ we can, by an appropriate scaling, obtain an equivalent CSM where both the costs
and prizes take values in N ∪ {0}, that is, we may assume c(e) ∈ N ∪ {0} and p(u) ∈ N ∪ {0} for
every e ∈ E(T ) and u ∈ V (T ), respectively.
First, we consider the restriction on a CSM M = (T,C, P ) where C consists of a single
penetration-cost value, that is, C = {1, 1, . . . , 1} consists of n copies of the unit penetration cost
one. From a realistic point of view, this assumption seems to be reasonable; many computer net-
works consist of computers with similar password/encryption security systems on each computer
(that is, the penetration cost is the same for all of the computers), whereas the computers might
store data of vastly distinct values (that is, the prizes are distinct).
Convention: In what follows, it will be convenient to denote the multiset containing n (or an
arbitrary number of) copies of 1 by I. In a similar way, we will denote by 1 the map that maps
each element of the appropriate domain to 1. As the domain of 1 should be self-evident each time,
there should be no ambiguity about it each time.
Definition 5.2. A P-model is a CSM M = (T, I, P ) where T has n non-root vertices and where I
is constant, consisting of n copies of the unit penetration cost.
Consider a SS (T, c, p) of a CSM M = (T,C, P ). We can obtain an equivalent SS (T ′,1, p′) of
a P-model M ′ = (T ′, I, P ′) in the following way: for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E(T ) with penetration
cost c(e) = k ∈ N and prizes p(u), p(v) ∈ N of its head and tail, respectively, replace the 1-path
(u, e, v) with a directed path of new vertices and edges (u, e1, u1, e2, u2, . . . , uk−1, ek, v) of length
k. We extend the penetration cost and prize functions by adding zero-prize vertices where needed,
that is, 1(f) = 1 for each f ∈ E(T ′), and we let
p′(u) = p(u), p′(v) = p(v), and p′(u1) = p
′(u2) = · · · = p
′(uk−1) = 0.
In this way we obtain a SS (T ′, c′, p′) of a P-model M ′ = (T ′, I, P ′). We view the vertices V (T ) of
positive prize as a subset of V (T ′) (namely, those vertices of T ′ with positive prize).1
Recall that T is a rooted contraction of T ′ if T is obtained from T ′ by a sequence of simple
contractions of edges, and where any vertex contracted into the root remains the root. With rooted
trees, this means precisely that T is a rooted minor of T ′ [2, p. 54].
Proposition 5.3. Any SS (T, c, p) of a CSM M = (T,C, P ) is equivalent to a SS (T ′,1, p′) of
a P-model M ′ = (T ′, I, P ′) where (i) T is rooted minor of T ′, and (ii) p′(u) = p(u) for each
u ∈ V (T ) ⊆ V (T ′), and p′(u) = 0, otherwise.
Proof. (Sketch) Given a budget B ∈ Q+, clearly any optimal attack τ on a SS (T, c, p) having
pr(τ, c, p) = pr⋆(B, c, p) has an equivalent attack τ ′ on a SS (T ′,1, p′) of the same cost cst(τ ′,1, p′) =
cst(τ, c, p) and hence within the budget B, where τ ′ is the smallest subtree of T ′ that contains all
of the vertices of τ . By construction, we also have that pr(τ ′,1, p′) = pr(τ, c, p) = pr⋆(B, c, p) since
all of the vertices from τ are in τ ′ and have the same prize there, and the other vertices in τ ′ have
prize zero. This shows that pr⋆(B, c, p) ≤ pr⋆(B,1, p′).
1Note that there are some redundant definitions on the prizes of the vertices when considering incident edges, but
the assignments do agree, as they have the same prize values as in T .
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Conversely, an optimal attack τ ′ on (T ′,1, p′) with pr(τ ′,1, p′) = pr⋆(B,1, p′) yields an attack
τ on (T, c, p) by letting τ be the subtree of T induced by the vertices V (τ ′) ∩ V (T ). In this way
pr(τ, c, p) = pr(τ ′,1, p′) and cst(τ, c, p) ≤ cst(τ ′,1, p′), since some of the vertices of τ ′ might have
zero prize, as they are not in τ . By definition of pr⋆(·) we have that pr⋆(B,1, p′) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p).
Hence, the SS (T, c, p) and (T ′,1, p′) are equivalent. ⊓⊔
Secondly, and dually, we can restrict our attention to the case where the multiset of prizes P
consists of a single unit prize value, so P = I = {1, 1, . . . , 1} consists of n copies of the unit prize.
Definition 5.4. A C-model is a CSM M = (T,C, I), where T has n non-root vertices and where
I is constant, consisting of n copies of the unit prize.
As before, consider a SS (T, c, p) of a CSM M = (T,C, P ). We can obtain an equivalent SS
(T ′′, c′′,1) of a C-modelM ′′ = (T ′′, C ′′, I) in the following way: for each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E(T ) with
penetration cost c(e) = k ∈ N and prizes p(u), p(v) ∈ N of its head and tail, respectively, replace
the 1-path (u, e, v) with a directed path of new vertices and edges (u, e, u1, e1, u2, . . . , uk−1, ek−1, v)
of length k. We extend the penetration cost and prize functions by adding zero-cost edges where
needed, that is, 1(w) = 1 for every w ∈ V (T ′′), and we let
c′′(e) = c(e) and c′′(e1) = c
′′(e2) = · · · = c
′′(ek−1) = 0.
In this way we obtain a SS (T ′′, c′′,1) of a C-model M ′′ = (T ′′, C ′′, I), where the multiset of prizes
consists of a single unit prize value (
∑
u∈V (T )\{r} p(u) copies of it). We also view the edges E(T ) of
positive penetration cost as a subset of E(T ′′) (namely, those edges of T ′′ with positive penetration
cost). We also have the following proposition that is dual to Proposition 5.3.
Proposition 5.5. Any SS (T, c, p) of a CSM M = (T,C, P ) is equivalent to a SS (T ′′, c′′,1) of
a C-model M ′′ = (T ′′, C ′′, I), where (i) T is rooted minor of T ′′, and (ii) c′′(e) = c(e) for each
e ∈ E(T ) ⊆ E(T ′′), and c′′(e) = 0, otherwise.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose we are given a budget B ∈ Q+ and an optimal attack τ on a SS (T, c, p)
with pr(τ, c, p) = pr⋆(B, c, p). Here (T ′′, c′′,1) has an equivalent attack τ ′′, where τ ′′ is the largest
subtree of T ′′ that contains all of the edges of τ and no other edges of T . Note that cst(τ ′′, c′′,1) =
cst(τ, c, p) since all of the additional edges of τ ′′ that are not in V (τ) have zero penetration cost, and
so τ ′′ is within the budget B. Also, by construction we have pr(τ ′′, c′′,1) = pr(τ, c, p) = pr⋆(B, c, p).
This result shows that pr⋆(B, c, p) ≤ pr⋆(B, c′′,1).
Conversely, consider an optimal attack τ ′′ on (T ′′, c′′,1) with pr(τ ′′, c′′,1) = pr⋆(B, c′′,1). By
the optimality of τ ′′, every leaf of τ ′′ is a tail of an edge of T , since otherwise we can append
that edge (of zero penetration cost), and thereby obtain an attack with a prize strictly more
than pr(τ ′′, c′′,1), a contradiction. The edges E(τ ′′) ∩ E(T ) induce a subtree τ of T of the same
cost cst(τ, c, p) = cst(τ ′′, c′′,1); and moreover, τ ′′ is, by its optimality, the largest subtree of T ′′
that contains exactly all of the edges of τ , and so pr(τ, c, p) = pr(τ ′′, c′′,1) = pr⋆(B, c′′,1). This
result shows that pr⋆(B, c′′,1) ≤ pr⋆(B, c, p). This proves that the SS (T, c, p) and (T ′′, c′′,1) are
equivalent. ⊓⊔
We now present some examples of both P- and C-models that will play a pivotal role in our
discussion to come.
Definition 5.6. Let T (2) denote the rooted tree given as follows:
V (T (2)) = {r, u1, u2, u3, u4, u5},
E(T (2)) = {(r, u1), (r, u2), (u1, u3), (u2, u4), (u2, u5)}.
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Note that T (2) has all of its non-root vertices on two non-zero levels. Similarly, let T (3) denote
the rooted tree given as follows:
V (T (3)) = {r, u1, u2, u3, u4},
E(T (3)) = {(r, u1), (r, u2), (u2, u3), (u3, u4)}.
Note that T (3) has all of its vertices on three non-zero levels.
Convention: For convenience we label the edges of both T (2) and T (3) with the same index
as their heads:
T (2) : e1 = (r, u1), e2 = (r, u2), e3 = (u1, u3), e4 = (u2, u4), e5 = (u2, u5).
T (3) : e1 = (r, u1), e2 = (r, u2), e3 = (u1, u3), e4 = (u3, u4).
r
u1 u2
u3 u4 u5
e1 e2
e3 e4 e5
T (2)
r
u1 u2
u3
u4
e1 e2
e3
e4
T (3)
Example 5.7.
Consider a P-model (with c = 1) on the rooted tree T (2), where the prize values are given by
P = {0, 1, 2, 2, 3}.
Prize Assignment (A): Consider the case where the prizes have been simultaneously assigned
to the non-root vertices of T (2) by p(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5) := (0, 1, 3, 2, 2) in the obvious way. We will
use a similar shorthand notation later for the bijection c. In this case we see that for budgets of
B = 2, 3, we have pr⋆(2,1, p) = 3 and pr⋆(3,1, p) = 5, respectively.
Prize Assignment (B): Consider now the case where the prizes have been simultaneously as-
signed to the non-root vertices of T (2) by p′(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5) := (1, 0, 3, 2, 2). In this case we see
that for the same budgets of B = 2, 3 as in (A), we have pr⋆(2,1, p′) = 4 and pr⋆(3,1, p′) = 4,
respectively.
From these assignments we see that for budget B = 2, the SS in (A) is better than the one in
(B), and for B = 3, the SS in (B) is better than the one in (A).
Example 5.8.
Consider a P-model on the rooted tree T (3), where the prize values are given by P = {0, 0, 1, 1}.
Prize Assignment (A): Consider the case where the prizes have been simultaneously assigned to
the non-root vertices of T (3) by p(u1, u2, u3, u4) := (0, 0, 1, 1). In this case we see that for budgets
of B = 1, 3, we have pr⋆(1,1, p) = 0 and pr⋆(3,1, p) = 2, respectively.
Prize Assignment (B): Consider now the case where the prizes have been simultaneously as-
signed to the non-root vertices of T (3) by p′(u1, u2, u3, u4) := (1, 0, 0, 1). In this case we see that for
the same budgets of B = 1, 3 as in (A), we have pr⋆(1,1, p′) = 1 and pr⋆(3,1, p′) = 1, respectively.
From these assignments we see that for budget B = 1, the SS in (A) is better than the one in
(B), and for B = 3, the SS in (B) is better than the one in (A). From these examples we have the
following observation.
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Observation 5.9. For general prize values P , neither of the P-models M = (T (2), I, P ) nor
M = (T (3), I, P ) have optimal SSs.
We will now consider the dual cases of the C-models.
Example 5.10.
Consider a C-model (with p = 1) on the rooted tree T (2), where the penetration costs are given
by C = {0, 1, 1, 2, 3}.
Cost Assignment (A): Consider the case where the penetration costs have been simultaneously
assigned to the edges of T (2) by c(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) := (3, 2, 0, 1, 1). In this case we see that for
budgets of B = 2, 4, we have pr⋆(2, c,1) = 1 and pr⋆(4, c,1) = 3, respectively.
Cost Assignment (B): Consider now the case where the penetration costs have been simulta-
neously assigned to the edges of T (2) by c′(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) := (2, 3, 0, 1, 1). In this case we see
that for the same budgets of B = 2, 4 as in (A), we have pr⋆(2, c′,1) = 2 and pr⋆(4, c′,1) = 2,
respectively.
From these assignments we see that for budget B = 2, the SS in (A) is better than the one in
(B), and for B = 4, the SS in (B) is better than the one in (A).
Example 5.11.
Consider now a C-model on the rooted tree T (3), where the penetration costs are given by C =
{0, 0, 1, 1}.
Cost Assignment (A): Consider the case where the penetration costs have been simultaneously
assigned to the edges of T (3) by c(e1, e2, e3, e4) := (1, 1, 0, 0). In this case we see that for budgets
of B = 0, 1, we have pr⋆(0, c,1) = 0 and pr⋆(1, c,1) = 3, respectively.
Cost Assignment (B): Consider now the case where the penetration costs have been assigned
to the edges of T (3) by c′(e1, e2, e3, e4) := (0, 1, 1, 0). In this case we see that for the same budgets
of B = 0, 1 as in (A), we have pr⋆(0, c′,1) = 1 and pr⋆(1, c′,1) = 2, respectively.
From these assignments we see that for budget B = 0, the SS in (A) is better than the one in
(B), and for B = 1, the SS in (B) is better than the one in (A).
From these examples we conclude the following.
Observation 5.12. For general penetration costs C, neither of the C-models M = (T (2), C, I) nor
M = (T (3), C, I) have optimal SSs.
Remarks: (i) Note that in Examples 5.7 and 5.10 involving the rooted tree T (2), we have that
the prize assignments to the non-root vertices and cost assignments to the corresponding edges sum
up to a constant vector for both assignments (A) and (B):
(A) : p(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5) + c(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) = (0, 1, 3, 2, 2) + (3, 2, 0, 1, 1) = (3, 3, 3, 3, 3),
(B) : p′(u1, u2, u3, u4, u5) + c
′(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5) = (1, 0, 3, 2, 2) + (2, 3, 0, 1, 1) = (3, 3, 3, 3, 3),
and similarly for the rooted tree T (3):
(A) : p(u1, u2, u3, u4) + c(e1, e2, e3, e4) = (0, 0, 1, 1) + (1, 1, 0, 0) = (1, 1, 1, 1),
(B) : p′(u1, u2, u3, u4) + c
′(e1, e2, e3, e4) = (1, 0, 0, 1) + (0, 1, 1, 0) = (1, 1, 1, 1).
This duality is not a coincidence and will discussed in more detail in section 7. (ii) Although special
cases of Theorems 6.1, 6.2, 7.21 and 7.22, it is an easy combinatorial exercise to see that both a C-
or P-model M = (T,C, P ), where T is a proper rooted subtree of either T (2) or T (3) does indeed
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have an optimal SS, and so T (2) and T (3) are the smallest rooted trees, in either model, with no
optimal SS. This point will also be discussed and stated explicitly in sections 6 and 7.
Consider now a given rooted tree T and another rooted tree T † containing T as a rooted subtree,
so T ⊆ T †. Assume that the P-modelM = (T, I, P ) has no optimal SS. ExtendM to a P-model on
T † by adding a zero prize for each vertex in V (T †) \ V (T ), so P † = P ∪Z, where Z is the multiset
consisting of |V (T †)| − |V (T )| copies of 0. In this case we have the following.
Observation 5.13. If M = (T, I, P ) is a P-model with no optimal SS, and T † contains T as a
rooted subtree, then the P-model M † = (T †, I, P †) has no optimal SS.
Proof. (Sketch) For any budget consisting of B = m edges and a SS (T,1, p), there is a rooted
subtree τ of T with m edges such that pr(τ,1, p) = pr⋆(m,1, p). Let 1 and p† be the obvious
extensions of 1 and p to T †, by letting 1(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E(T †) and p†(u) = 0 for any u ∈
V (T †) \ V (T ). If τ ′ is a rooted subtree of T † with m edges, then τ ′ ∩ T is a rooted subtree of both
T and T † on m or fewer edges. Since any vertex of V (τ ′) \ V (T ) has zero prize, we have
pr(τ ′,1, p†) = pr(τ ′ ∩ T,1, p†) = pr(τ ′ ∩ T,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p),
with equality for τ ′ = τ since τ ⊆ T ⊆ T †. Hence, pr⋆(m,1, p†) = pr⋆(m,1, p), and we conclude
that if M = (T, I, P ) has no optimal SS, then neither does M † = (T †, I, P †). ⊓⊔
Dually, assume that we have a C-model M = (T,C, I) that has no optimal SS, and similarly,
let T † be a rooted subtree containing T as a rooted subtree. Extend M to a C-model on T † by
adding penetration costs of ∞2 for each edge of T † that is not in T , so C† = C ∪Y , where Y is the
multiset consisting of |E(T †)| − |E(T )| copies of ∞.
Observation 5.14. If M = (T,C, I) is a C-model with no optimal SS, and T † contains T as a
rooted subtree, then the C-model M † = (T †, C†, I) has no optimal SS.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is similar to the one for Observation 5.13. For any budget B ∈ Q+ and a
SS (T, c,1) of M , there is a rooted subtree τ of T with m edges such that pr(τ, c,1) = pr⋆(B, c,1).
Let c† and 1 be the obvious extensions of c and 1 to T †, by letting c†(e) =∞ for all e ∈ E(T †)\E(T ).
If τ ′ is a rooted subtree of T † within the attacker’s budget of B < ∞, then every edge of τ ′ must
be in T , and so τ ′ ⊆ T ⊆ T †. Since c† agrees with c on the edges of T we have
pr(τ ′, c†,1) = pr(τ ′, c,1) ≤ pr⋆(B, c,1),
with equality for τ ′ = τ . Hence, pr⋆(B, c†,1) = pr⋆(B, c,1), and we conclude that if M = (T,C, I)
has no SS, then neither does M † = (T †, C†, I). ⊓⊔
By Observations 5.9, 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.15. If T is a rooted tree such that any P- or C-model M = (T,C, P ) has an optimal
SS, then T contains neither T (2) nor T (3) as rooted subtrees.
Let T be a rooted tree such that any CSM M = (T,C, P ) has an optimal SS. Assume further
that T is not a path rooted at one of its two leaves. If T has at least three non-zero levels (we
consider the root r to be the unique level-0 vertex), then T must contain T (3) as a rooted subtree
2Where here we can choose ∞ to be the number of edges of T plus one, that is, a large number exceeding any
sensible attack budget.
15
and hence, by Corollary 5.15, there is a CSM M = (T,C, P ) with no optimal SS, contradicting our
assumption on T . Consequently, T has at most two non-zero levels.
If T has at most two non-zero levels, and it has two leaves of distance four apart (with the
root r being midways between them), then neither parent of the leaves is of degree three or more,
because then T has T (2) as a rooted subtree. And, so again, by Corollary 5.15, there is a CSM
M = (T,C, P ) with no optimal SS. This observation again contradicts our assumption on T . As
a result, either (i) T has a diameter of three and is obtained by attaching an arbitrary number of
leaves to the end vertices of a single edge and then rooting it at one of the end-vertices of the edge,
or (ii) T has diameter of four and each level-one vertex has degree at most two.
Recall that a caterpillar tree is a tree where each vertex is within distance one of a central path,
and that a spider tree is a tree with one vertex of degree at least three and all other vertices of
degree at most two.
Definition 5.16. A rooted path is a path rooted at one of its two leaves.
A rooted star is a star rooted at its unique center vertex.
A 3-caterpillar is a caterpillar tree of diameter three.
A rooted 3-caterpillar is a 3-caterpillar rooted at one of its two center vertices.
A 4-spider is a spider tree of diameter four with its unique center vertex of degree at least
three.
A rooted 4-spider is a 4-spider rooted at its unique center vertex.
By Corollary 5.15 and the discussion just before Definition 5.16, we therefore have the following
main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.17. If T is a rooted tree such that any P- or C-model M = (T,C, P ) has an optimal SS,
then T is one of the following types: (i) a rooted path, (ii) a rooted star, (iii) a rooted 3-caterpillar,
or (iv) a rooted 4-spider.
It remains to be seen whether or not a rooted 3-caterpillar or a rooted 4-spider T is such that
any P- or C-model M = (T,C, P ) has an optimal SS. This item will be the main topic of the next
two sections.
6 P-models with Optimal Security Systems
In this section we prove that if T is one of the four types of rooted trees mentioned in Theorem 5.17,
then any P-model M = (T, I, P ) indeed has an optimal SS. The C-models will be discussed in
section 7. We already have that any P-model M = (T, I, P ) (in fact, any CSM M = (T,C, P )),
where T is a rooted path or a rooted star, does have an optimal SS, so it suffices to consider rooted
3-caterpillars and rooted 4-spiders.
Let T be a rooted 3-caterpillar on vertices {r, u1, . . . , un} with edges given by
E(T ) = {(r, u1), . . . , (r, uk), (u1, uk+1), . . . , (u1, un)}, (4)
where 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. As before, we label the edges by the index of their heads, so ei = (r, ui) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and ei = (u1, ui) for i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Our first result is the following.
Theorem 6.1. Let M = (T, I, P ) be a P-model where T is a rooted 3-caterpillar and P =
{p1, . . . , pn} is a multiset of possible prizes indexed increasingly p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. Then the
SS (T,1, p), where p(ui) = pi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is an optimal SS for M .
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Proof. Let B = m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} be the attacker’s budget, that is the number of edges an adversary
can afford to penetrate. We want to show that pr⋆(m,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′) for any prize assignment
p′ to the vertices of the rooted 3-caterpillar T .
Let τ ⊆ T be a rooted subtree of T on m edges with pr(τ,1, p) = pr⋆(m,1, p). There are two
cases we need to consider.
First case: e1 ∈ E(τ). Since all the leaves are connected to one of the end-vertices of
e1 = (r, u1), the remaining m− 1 edges of τ must be incident to the m− 1 maximum prize vertices,
and so pr⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p) = pn + pn−1 + · · ·+ pn−m+2 + p1. If p
′ is another prize assignment
to the vertices of T , then p′(u1) = pc, where c ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, pr
⋆(m,1, p′) ≥ pr(τ ′,1, p′),
where τ ′ is a rooted subtree of T that contains e1 and contains all the remaining m− 1 maximum
prizes, and so
pr(τ ′,1, p′) =
{
pn + pn−1 + · · · + pn−m+1 if c ∈ {n −m+ 1, . . . , n},
pn + pn−1 + · · · + pn−m+2 + pc if c 6∈ {n −m+ 1, . . . , n}.
In either case we have pr(τ ′,1, p′) ≥ pn+pn−1+· · · pn−m+2+p1 = pr
⋆(m,1, p), and so pr⋆(m,1, p′) ≥
pr⋆(m,1, p) in this case.
Second case: e1 6∈ E(τ). For this case to be possible we must have m ≤ k−1, since otherwise
e1 must be in τ . Secondly, we must have that τ contains all the maximum prize vertices on level
one and so pr⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p) = pk + pk−1 + · · ·+ pk−m+1. In particular, we must have
pk + pk−1 + · · ·+ pk−m+1 ≥ pn + pn−1 + · · ·+ pn−m+2 + p1,
since a tree containing e1 does not have a greater total prize than τ . If p
′ is another prize assignment
to the vertices of T , then let {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk} be the indices of the prizes assigned to vertices on level
one by p′, that is, {pℓ1 , . . . , pℓk} = {p
′(u1), . . . , p
′(uk)} as multisets. If now τ
′ is the rooted subtree
of T with m edges containing the m vertices with the largest prizes, then, since pℓi ≥ pi for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have
pr⋆(m,1, p′) ≥ pr(τ ′,1, p′) = pℓk + pℓk−1 + · · ·+ pℓk−m+1 ≥ pk + pk−1 + · · ·+ pk−m+1 = pr
⋆(m,1, p),
in this case as well. This completes the proof that the SS (T, p) is optimal. ⊓⊔
Now, let T be a rooted 4-spider on vertices {r, u1, . . . , un} with edges given by
E(T ) = {(r, u1), . . . , (r, uk), (u1, uk+1), (u2, uk+2), . . . , (un−k, un)}, (5)
where n/2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2. As before, the edges are labeled by the index of their heads: ei = (r, ui)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and ei = (ui−k, ui) for i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n}. Our second result is the following.
Theorem 6.2. Let M = (T, I, P ) be a P-model, where T is a rooted 4-spider and P = {p1, . . . , pn}
is a multiset of possible prizes indexed increasingly p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. Then the SS (T,1, p), where
p(ui) = pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and p(ui) = pn+k+1−i for i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} is an optimal SS for M .
Before we prove Theorem 6.2, we need a few lemmas that will come in handy for the proof.
Lemma 6.3. Let T be a 4-spider presented as in (5) and m ∈ N. Let p be a prize assignment
on V (T ) such that pi = p(ui) ≤ p(uj) = pj, where ui is on level one and uj is a leaf of T . If p
′
is the prize assignment obtained from p by swapping the prizes of ui and uj , then pr
⋆(m,1, p) ≤
pr⋆(m,1, p′).
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Proof. If j = k + i, so uj is the unique child of ui, then the lemma holds by (1). Hence, we can
assume that uj is not a child of ui. Let τ ⊆ T be a max-prize rooted subtree on m edges, so
pr(τ,1, p) = pr⋆(m,1, p). We now consider the following cases.
If either both ui and uj are vertices of τ , or neither of them are, then clearly pr
⋆(m,1, p) =
pr(τ,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′).
If ui ∈ V (τ) and uj 6∈ V (τ), then
pr⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p) ≤ pr(τ,1, p) − pi + pj = pr(τ,1, p
′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p).
If ui 6∈ V (τ) and uj ∈ V (τ), then, since ui is on level one and uj is a leaf of τ , we have that
τ ′ = (τ − uj) ∪ ui is also a rooted subtree of T on m vertices and pr
⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p) =
pr(τ ′,1, p′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′), which completes our proof. ⊓⊔
Let M = (T, I, P ) be a P-model where T is a rooted 4-spider, P = {p1, . . . , pn}, and p
′ be an
arbitrary prize assignment on V (T ). Since every vertex of T on level two is automatically a leaf, we
can, by repeated use of Lemma 6.3, obtain a prize assignment with smaller max-prize with respect
to any m that has its n−k largest prizes on its level-two vertices, and hence has its k smallest prizes
on the level-one vertices u1, . . . , uk of T . By further use of the same Lemma 6.3 when considering
these level-one vertices of T , we can obtain a prize assignment p that has its smallest prizes on the
non-leaf vertices on level one and yet with smaller max-prize, so pr⋆(m,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′) for any
m. Note that our p satisfies
p({u1, . . . , un−k}) = {p1, . . . , pn−k}, p({uk+1, . . . , un}) = {pk+1, . . . , pn}.
As the level-one vertices of T can be assumed to be ordered by their prizes, we summarize in the
following.
Corollary 6.4. From any prize assignment p′ we can by repeated use of Lemma 6.3 obtain a prize
assignment p on our 4-spider T , presented as in (5), such that
p(ui) = pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and p(ui) = pπ(i) for all i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
where π is a permutation of {k + 1, . . . , n}, and with pr⋆(m,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′) for any m ∈ N.
Our next lemma provides our final tool in proving Theorem 6.2.
Lemma 6.5. Let T be a 4-spider presented as in (5) and m ∈ N. Let p be a prize assignment on
V (T ) such that for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n − k} with i < j, we have p(ui) ≤ p(uj) and p(ui+k) ≥
p(uj+k). If p
′ is a prize assignment where the prizes on ui+k and uj+k have been swapped, then
pr⋆(m,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′).
Proof. Let τ ⊆ T be a max-prize rooted subtree on m edges with respect to p, so pr(τ,1, p) =
pr⋆(m,1, p). We now consider the following cases.
If either both ui+k and uj+k are vertices of τ , or neither of them are, then clearly pr
⋆(m,1, p) =
pr(τ,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′).
If ui+k 6∈ V (τ) and uj+k ∈ V (τ), then
pr⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p) ≤ pr(τ,1, p)− p(uj+k) + p(ui+k) = pr(τ,1, p
′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′).
If ui+k ∈ V (τ) and uj+k 6∈ V (τ), then we consider two (sub-)cases. If uj ∈ V (τ), then
since uj is a leaf in τ , we have that τ
′ = (τ − ui+k) ∪ uj+k is also a rooted subtree of T on m
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vertices and pr⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p) = pr(τ ′,1, p′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′). If uj 6∈ V (τ), then τ
′′ =
(τ − {ui, ui+k}) ∪ {uj , uj+k} is also a rooted subtree of T on m vertices, and
pr⋆(m,1, p) = pr(τ,1, p)
≤ pr(τ,1, p) − p(ui)− p(uj+k) + p(uj) + p(ui+k)
= pr(τ ′′,1, p′)
≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′),
which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Let T be a 4-spider, p a prize assignment as given in Theorem 6.2, and
m ∈ N. Let p′ be an arbitrary prize assignment of the vertices of T . By Corollary 6.4 we can obtain
a prize assignment p′′ such that
p′′(ui) = pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and p
′′(ui) = pπ(i) for all i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
where π is a permutation of {k + 1, . . . , n}, and with pr⋆(m,1, p′′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′) for any m ∈ N.
By Lemma 6.5 we can obtain a prize assignment p on V (T ) from p′′ simply by ordering the prizes
on the level-two leaves in a decreasing order, thereby obtaining the very prize assignment p from
Theorem 6.2 that satisfies pr⋆(m,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′′) for any m ∈ N. This proves that for any
m ∈ N we have pr⋆(m,1, p) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′′) ≤ pr⋆(m,1, p′), and since p′ was an arbitrary prize
assignment, the proof is complete. ⊓⊔
As a further observation, we can describe the optimal SAs on the P-modelM = (T, I, P ), where
T is a rooted 4-spider with the vertices and edges labeled as in (5), as follows.
Observation 6.6. Let T be a 4-spider, p a prize assignment as in Theorem 6.2, and m ∈ N. Then
there is a max-prize rooted subtree τ ⊆ T on m edges with respect to p, so pr(τ,1, p) = pr⋆(m,1, p),
with the following property:
1. If n ≤ 2k − 1, then all the leaves of τ are leaves in T , and hence in {un−k+1, . . . , un}.
2. If n = 2k, then τ has at most one leaf on level one, in which case it can assumed to be uk.
Proof. Suppose τ has two leaves ui, uj ∈ {u1, . . . , un−k}. In this case τ
′ = (τ − uj) ∪ uk+i is also a
rooted subtree of T on m edges and has pr(τ ′,1, p) ≥ pr(τ,1, p). Hence, we can assume τ to have
at most one leaf from {u1, . . . , un−k}.
Suppose τ has one leaf ui ∈ {u1, . . . , un−k}. We now consider the two cases; k > n − k and
k = n− k.
First case: k > n − k or n ≤ 2k − 1. If τ has another leaf uj ∈ {un−k+1, . . . , nk}, then,
as above, τ ′ = (τ − uj) ∪ uk+i has pr(τ
′,1, p) ≥ pr(τ,1, p). Otherwise, τ has no leaves from
{un−k+1, . . . , nk} 6= ∅. In this case τ
′′ = (τ − ui) ∪ uk is a rooted subtree of T on m edges with
pr(τ ′′,1, p) ≥ pr(τ,1, p). Hence, we can assume that τ has no leaves from {u1, . . . , un−k}, which
proves or claim in this case.
Second case: k = n − k or n = 2k. In this case τ has the unique level-one leaf ui. If i < k,
then uk has a unique child u2k in τ , and so τ
′ = (τ − u2k) ∪ uk+i has the unique level-one leaf uk
and pr(τ ′,1, p) ≥ pr(τ,1, p). Hence, we can assume that τ has its unique level-one leaf uk. ⊓⊔
Remark: Note that in the case n ≤ 2k − 1 in the proof of Observation 6.6, all the level-one
leaves of τ can be assumed to be from {un−k+1, . . . , uk}. If we have ℓ of them, then they can further
be assumed to be uk−ℓ+1, . . . , uk.
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7 Duality between P- and C-Models
In this section we state and use a duality between the P- and C-models, which then can be used
to obtain similar results for C-models that we obtained for P-models in the previous section. In
particular, we will demonstrate that if T is one of the four types of rooted trees mentioned in
Theorem 5.17, then any C-model M = (T,C, I) indeed has an optimal SS, as we proved was the
case for the P-model. As with the P-model, we already have that any C-model M = (T,C, I) (in
fact, any CSM M = (T,C, P )), where T is a rooted path or a rooted star, does have an optimal
SS.
As mentioned in the remarks right after Observation 5.12, we now explicitly examine an example
of a rooted proper subtree Tp(2) of T (2), for which any P- or C-model M = (Tp(2), C, P ) has an
optimal security system. For the next two examples, and just as in the convention right before
Example 3.10, let Tp(2) denote the rooted tree, whose underlying graph is a path, on five vertices
V (Tp(2)) = {r, u1, u2, u3, u4} and edges E(Tp(2)) = {(r, u1), (r, u2), (u1, u3), (u2, u4)} rooted at its
center vertex. We continue the convention of labeling the edges by the same index as their heads:
e1 = (r, u1), e2 = (r, u2), e3 = (u1, u3), and e4 = (u2, u4).
r
u1 u2
u3 u4
e1 e2
e3 e4
Tp(2)
Example 7.1.
Consider a P-model (with c = 1) on the rooted tree Tp(2) where the prize values P = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
are general real positive values ordered increasingly p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3 ≤ p4. By Theorem 6.2 an
optimal SS for our CSM M = (Tp(2), I, P ) is obtained by assigning the prizes as p(u1, u2, u3, u4) :=
(p1, p2, p4, p3). We can explicitly obtain the max-prize subtree for each given budgets B ∈ R that
yields the following:
pr⋆(B,1, p) =


0 for B < 1,
p2 for 1 ≤ B < 2,
max(p1 + p4, p2 + p3) for 2 ≤ B < 3,
p1 + p2 + p4 for 3 ≤ B < 4,
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 for 4 ≤ B.
Example 7.2.
Consider a C-model (with p = 1) on the rooted tree Tp(2) where the penetration cost values
C = {c1, c2, c3, c4} are general real positive values ordered decreasingly c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3 ≥ c4. It is now
an easy combinatorial exercise to verify directly that an optimal SS for our CSM M = (Tp(2), C, I)
can be obtained by assigning penetration costs as c(u1, u2, u3, u4) := (c1, c2, c4, c3), in the same
(index-)order as for the P-model in Example 7.1. We explicitly obtain the max-prize subtree for
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each given budget B ∈ R that yields the following:
pr⋆(B, c,1) =


0 for B < c2,
1 for c2 ≤ B < min(c1 + c4, c2 + c3),
2 for min(c1 + c4, c2 + c3) ≤ B < c1 + c2 + c4,
3 for c1 + c2 + c4 ≤ B < c1 + c2 + c3 + c4,
4 for c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 ≤ B.
Let K be a sufficiently large cost number (any real number ≥ max(c1, . . . , c4) + 1 will do), and
write each edge-cost of the form ci = K − c
′
i. In this way pr
⋆(B, c,1) will take the following form
pr⋆(B, c,1) =


0 for B < K − c′2,
1 for K − c′2 ≤ B < 2K −max(c
′
1 + c
′
4, c
′
2 + c
′
3),
2 for 2K −max(c′1 + c
′
4, c
′
2 + c
′
3) ≤ B < 3K − (c
′
1 + c
′
2 + c
′
4),
3 for 3K − (c′1 + c
′
2 + c
′
4) ≤ B < 4K − (c
′
1 + c
′
2 + c
′
3 + c
′
4),
4 for 4K − (c′1 + c
′
2 + c
′
3 + c
′
4) ≤ B.
From the above we see the evident resemblance to the expression for pr⋆(B,1, p) of the P-model in
Example 7.1. This is a glimpse of a duality between the P-models and the C-models that we will
now describe.
Convention: In what follows, it will be convenient to view the cost and prize assignments c and
p not as functions as in Definition 3.2, but rather as vectors c˜ = (c1, . . . , cn) and p˜ = (p1, . . . , pn) in
the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn, which can be obtained by a fixed labeling of the n non-root
vertices u1, . . . , un and a corresponding labeling of the edges e1, . . . , en, with our usual convention
that for each i the vertex ui is the head of ei, and by letting ci := c(ei) and pi := p(ui).
For a given n ∈ N, let B(Rn) denote the group of all bijections Rn → Rn with respect to
compositions of maps. For a ∈ Q+ and b ∈ Q the affine map α : R
n → Rn given by α(x˜) = ax˜+ b1˜,
where 1˜ = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn, is bijective with an inverse α−1(x˜) = 1
a
x˜− b
a
1˜ of the same type. Further,
if α′(x˜) = a′x˜ + b′1˜ is another such map, then the composition (α′ ◦ α)(x˜) = a′ax˜ + (a′b + b′)1˜ is
also a bijection of this very type. Since the identity map of Rn has a = 1 ∈ Q+ and b = 0 ∈ Q, we
have the following.
Observation 7.3. If n ∈ N then Gn = {α ∈ B(R
n) : α(x˜) = ax˜+b1˜, for some a ∈ Q+ and b ∈ Q}
is a subgroup of B(Rn).
By letting Gn act on the set R
n in the natural way, (α, x˜) 7→ α(x˜), then the group orbits
Gn(x˜) = {α(x˜) : α ∈ Gn} yield a partition of R
n into corresponding equivalence classes Rn =⋃
x˜∈R
n Gn(x˜). By intersecting with Q
n
+ we obtain the following equivalence classes that we seek.
Definition 7.4. For each x˜ ∈ Qn+ let [x˜] denote the equivalence class of x˜ with respect to the
partition of Rn into the Gn orbits: [x˜] = Gn(x˜) ∩Q
n
+.
We now justify the above equivalence of vectors of Qn+. The following observation is obtained
directly from Definition 3.2.
Observation 7.5. Let T be a rooted tree on n labeled non-root vertices and edges, τ a rooted subtree
of T , and α ∈ Gn given by α(x˜) = ax˜ + b1˜. If c˜, p˜ ∈ Q
n
+ are a cost and prize vector, respectively,
then we have
pr(τ, c˜, α(p˜)) = apr(τ, c˜, p˜) + |E(τ)|b,
cst(τ, α(c˜), p˜) = acst(τ, c˜, p˜) + |E(τ)|b.
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If J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and ΣJ : R
n → R is given by x˜ 7→
∑
i∈J xi, then we clearly have
ΣJ(α(x˜)) ≤ ΣJ(α(y˜))⇔ ΣJ(x˜) ≤ ΣJ(y˜), (6)
and hence the following corollary.
Corollary 7.6. Let T be a rooted tree on n labeled non-root vertices and edges, B ∈ Q+ a budget,
and α ∈ Gn given by α(x˜) = ax˜+ b1˜.
(i) If p˜ ∈ Qn+ is a prize vector, then we have
pr⋆(B, 1˜, α(p˜)) = apr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜) + b⌊B⌋. (7)
Further, both max prizes in (7) are attained at the same rooted subtree τ of T where |E(τ)| = ⌊B⌋.
(ii) If c˜ ∈ Qn+ is a cost vector, then we have
pr⋆(aB + bm,α(c˜), 1˜) = m⇔ pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m,
and further, both max prizes are attained at the same rooted subtree τ of T within the budget; that
is, |E(τ)| = m and cst(τ, c˜, 1˜) ≤ B.
Remarks: (i) That both max prizes are attained at the same rooted subtree τ in (i) in Corol-
lary 7.6 simply means that
pr(τ, 1˜, α(p˜)) = pr⋆(B, 1˜, α(p˜))⇔ pr(τ, 1˜, p˜) = pr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜),
which is a direct consequence of Observation 7.5 and (7). (ii) Also, for a rooted subtree τ with
|E(τ)| = m and cst(τ, c˜, 1˜) ≤ B, then by Observation 7.5 we also have cst(τ, α(c˜), 1˜) ≤ aB + bm,
and
pr(τ, c˜, 1˜) = m = pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜)⇔ pr(τ, α(c˜), 1˜) = m = pr⋆(aB + bm,α(c˜), 1˜).
We can, in fact, say a tad more than Corollary 7.6 for C-models M = (T,C, I).
Definition 7.7. Let M = (T,C, I) be a C-model. For a given cost vector c˜ ∈ Qn+ let Bm(c˜) denote
the smallest cost B ∈ Q+ with pr
⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m.
Note that
pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m⇔ Bm(c˜) ≤ B < Bm+1(c˜).
We also have the following useful lemma.
Lemma 7.8. If α ∈ Gn is given by α(x˜) = ax˜+ b1˜, then Bm(α(c˜)) = aBm(c˜) + bm.
Proof. By definition of Bm(c˜) we have pr
⋆(Bm(c˜), c˜, 1˜) = m, and hence by Corollary 7.6 pr
⋆(aBm(c˜)+
bm,α(c˜), 1˜) = m as well. Suppose that pr⋆(B′, α(c˜), 1˜) = m, where B′ < aBm(c˜) + bm. If now
B′ = aB′′+ bm, then B′′ < Bm(c˜) and we have again by Corollary 7.6 that pr
⋆(B′′, c˜, 1˜) = m. This
contradicts the definition of Bm(c˜). Hence, Bm(α(c˜) = aBm(c˜) + bm. ⊓⊔
Proposition 7.9. For m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and a cost vectors c˜ and c˜′ we have Bm(c˜) ≥ Bm(c˜
′) if
and only if for every budget B with pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m we have pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, c˜′, 1˜).
Proof. Suppose Bm(c˜) ≥ Bm(c˜
′), and let B be a budget with pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m. By definition we
then have B ≥ Bm(c˜) and hence B ≥ Bm(c˜
′) and therefore pr⋆(B, c˜′, 1˜) ≥ m = pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜).
Conversely, if for every budget B with pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m we have pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, c˜′, 1˜),
then, in particular for B = Bm(c˜) we have m = pr
⋆(Bm(c˜), c˜, 1˜) ≤ pr
⋆(Bm(c˜), c˜
′, 1˜), and hence, by
definition, Bm(c˜
′) ≤ Bm(c˜). ⊓⊔
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Convention: For a vector x˜ = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Q
n
+ let {x˜} denote its underlying multiset. So
if (T, c˜, p˜) is an SS for a CSM M = (T,C, P ), then we necessarily have C = {c˜} and P = {p˜} as
multisets. Also, we have {1˜} = I as the multiset containing n copies of 1.
Suppose pr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜′) for all p˜′ with {p˜′} = {p˜}. Then by Corollary 7.6 we get for
any α ∈ Gn with α(x˜) = ax˜+ b1˜, that
pr⋆(B, 1˜, α(p˜)) = apr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜) + b⌊B⌋ ≤ apr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜′) + b⌊B⌋ = pr⋆(B, 1˜, α(p˜′)),
and so we have the following.
Proposition 7.10. The SS (T, 1˜, p˜) is optimal for the P-model M = (T, I, {p˜}) with respect to the
budget B ∈ Q+ if and only if the SS (T, 1˜, α(p˜)) is optimal for the P-model M = (T, I, {α(p˜)}) with
respect to B.
In a similar way, we have by Proposition 7.9 that pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) = m ≤ pr⋆(B, c˜′, 1˜) whenever
Bm(c˜) ≤ B < Bm+1(c˜) and {c˜
′} = {c˜} if and only if Bm(c˜) ≥ Bm(c˜
′), which by Lemma 7.8 holds if
and only if
Bm(α(c˜)) = aBm(c˜) + bm ≥ aBm(c˜
′) + bm = Bm(α(c˜
′)).
In other words, pr⋆(B, c˜, 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, c˜′, 1˜) when Bm(c˜) ≤ B < Bm+1(c˜) holds if and only if
pr⋆(B′, α(c˜), 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B′, α(c˜′), 1˜) when Bm(α(c˜)) ≤ B
′ < Bm+1(α(c˜)). Since this holds for every
α ∈ Gn, which is a group with each element having an inverse, then we have the following.
Proposition 7.11. The SS (T, c˜, 1˜) is optimal for the C-model M = (T, {c˜}, I) with respect to
B ∈ [Bm(c˜), Bm+1(c˜)[∩Q+ if and only if the SS (T, α(c˜), 1˜) is optimal for the C-model M
′ =
(T, {α(c˜)}, I) with respect to B′ ∈ [Bm(α(c˜)), Bm+1(α(c˜))[∩Q+.
Combining Propositions 7.10 and 7.11, we have the following summarizing corollary.
Corollary 7.12. Let α ∈ Gn.
The SS (T, 1˜, p˜) is optimal for the P-model M = (T, I, {p˜}) if and only if the SS (T, 1˜, α(p˜)) is
optimal for the P-model M ′ = (T, I, {α(p˜)}).
The SS (T, c˜, 1˜) is optimal for the C-model M = (T, {c˜}, I) if and only if the SS (T, α(c˜), 1˜) is
optimal for the C-model M ′ = (T, {α(p˜)}, I).
Corollary 7.12 shows that optimality of security systems of both C- and P-models is Gn-invariant
when applied to the prize and cost vector, respectively.
Recall the equivalence class [x˜] = Gn(x˜) ∩Q
n
+ from Definition 7.4. We can now define induced
equivalence classes of SS of both C- and P-models. By Corollary 7.12 the following definition is
valid (that is, the terms are all well defined).
Definition 7.13. For a C-model M = (T,C, I) and a SS (T, c˜, 1˜) of M , we let
[(T, c˜, 1˜)] := {(T, x˜, 1˜) : x˜ ∈ [c˜]}.
We say that [(T, c˜, 1˜)] is optimal if one (T, x˜, 1˜) ∈ [(T, c˜, 1˜)] is optimal for its corresponding M =
(T, {x˜}, I), since then each element in [(T, c˜, 1˜)] is also optimal.
Likewise, for a P-model M = (T, I, P ) and a SS (T, 1˜, p˜) of M , we let
[(T, 1˜, p˜)] := {(T, 1˜, y˜) : y˜ ∈ [p˜]}.
We say that [(T, 1˜, p˜)] is optimal if one (T, 1˜, y˜) ∈ [(T, 1˜, p˜)] is optimal for its corresponding M =
(T, I, {y˜}), since then each element in [(T, 1˜, p˜)] is also optimal.
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With the setup just presented we now can define the dual of both vector classes and SS classes
for C- and P-models in the following.
Definition 7.14. For a vector x˜ and [x˜] = Gn(x˜) ∩ Q
n
+ as in Definition 7.4, then [x˜]
∗ := [−x˜] is
the dual vector class of [x˜].
For a C-model M = (T,C, I) and a SS (T, c˜, 1˜) of M , then [(T, c˜, 1˜)]∗ := [(T, 1˜,−c˜)] is the
corresponding dual P-model security system class (dual P-model SS class) of the C-model class
[(T, c˜, 1˜)].
Likewise, for a P-model M = (T, I, P ) and a SS (T, 1˜, p˜) of M , then [(T, 1˜, p˜)]∗ := [(T,−p˜, 1˜)]
is the corresponding dual C-model security system class (dual C-model SS class) of the P-model
class [(T, 1˜, p˜)].
Note that the double-dual yields the original class in each case: [x˜]∗∗ = [−x˜]∗ = [x˜], and
[(T, c˜, 1˜)]∗∗ = [(T, 1˜,−c˜)]∗ = [(T, c˜, 1˜)], [(T, 1˜, p˜)]∗∗ = [(T,−p˜, 1˜)]∗ = [(T, 1˜, p˜)].
For a P-model M = (T, I, P ) and a SS P-model class [(T, 1˜, p˜)] we can always assume the prize
vector p˜ is such pi ∈ [0, 1]∩Q+ for each i, since α(x˜) = ax˜ is indeed an element of Gn for any a > 0.
In this way c˜ = 1˜ − p˜ ∈ ([0, 1] ∩ Q+)
n is a legitimate cost vector, and we have [p˜]∗ = [1˜ − p˜] and
[(T, 1˜, p˜)]∗ = [(T, 1˜− p˜, 1˜)]. In what follows, we will call such a prize vector scaled. The following is
easy to show.
Claim 7.15. For a scaled prize vector p˜ with pi ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q+ for each i, and a rooted subtree τ of
T with |E(τ)| = m, then pr(τ, 1˜, p˜) + cst(τ, 1˜ − p˜, 1˜) = m.
Let p˜ be a scaled prize vector and assume B is a budget with pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) = m. Then there
is a rooted subtree τ of T on m edges such that cst(τ, 1˜ − p˜, 1˜) ≤ B, and hence there is such a
τ of smallest cost. Hence, we may assume τ is indeed such a rooted subtree of smallest cost. By
Claim 7.15 applied to 1˜− p˜, which is also scaled, we then have pr(τ, 1˜, p˜) = m− cst(τ, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) with
the smallest cst(τ, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) among rooted subtrees τ on m edges, and hence pr(τ, 1˜, p˜) is maximum
among all rooted subtrees τ on m edges, and so pr(τ, 1˜, p˜) = pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜). Hence,
B ≥ cst(τ, 1˜ − p˜, 1˜) = m− pr(τ, 1˜, p˜) = m− pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜).
Since cst(τ, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) is the smallest cost among all rooted subtrees on m edges, then
B′ = cst(τ, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) = m− pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜)
is indeed the smallest cost with pr⋆(B′, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) = m. By Definition 7.7 we then have the following.
Lemma 7.16. For m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and a scaled (prize) vector p˜, we have
Bm(1˜− p˜) = m− pr
⋆(m, 1˜, p˜).
As a direct consequence of Lemma 7.16, we then have
Corollary 7.17. For any m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and scaled vectors p˜ and p˜′, we have
Bm(1˜− p˜) ≥ Bm(1˜− p˜
′)⇔ pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜) ≤ pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜′).
We can now prove one of the main results in this section.
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Theorem 7.18. Let M = (T, I, P ) be a P-model, (T, 1˜, p˜) a SS for M where p˜ is scaled, and
m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Then pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜) ≤ pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜′) for any p˜′ with {p˜′} = P if and only if
pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, 1˜ − p˜′, 1˜) for any budget B with pr⋆(B, 1˜ − p˜, 1˜) = m and for any p˜′ with
{p˜′} = P .
Proof. By Corollary 7.17 we have that pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜) ≤ pr⋆(m, 1˜, p˜′) for any p˜′ with {p˜′} = P if and
only if Bm(1˜ − p˜) ≥ Bm(1˜ − p˜
′) for any p˜′ with {p˜′} = P which, by Proposition 7.9, holds if and
only if pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜′, 1˜) for all budgets B with pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) = m and for all p˜′
with {p˜′} = P . ⊓⊔
Note that by Theorem 7.18 we have that pr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, 1˜, p˜′) for any budget B and any
p˜′ with {p˜′} = {p˜}, if and only if pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) ≤ pr⋆(B, 1˜− p˜′, 1˜) for any budget B and any p˜′ with
{p˜′} = {p˜}. Hence, by Corollary 7.12 and Theorem 7.18 we therefore have the main conclusion of
this section in light of Definition 7.13.
Corollary 7.19. For a rooted tree T and a prize vector p˜ ∈ Qn+, then [(T, 1˜, p˜)] is an optimal
P-model SS class if and only if the dual C-model SS class [(T, 1˜, p˜)]∗ = [(T,−p˜, 1˜)] is optimal.
In particular, if p˜ is scaled, then the SS (T, 1˜, p˜) is optimal for the P-model M = (T, I, {p˜}) if
and only if the SS (T, 1˜− p˜, 1˜) is optimal for the C-model M = (T, {1˜ − p˜}, I).
Consequently, by Corollary 4.4, Theorems 4.6, 5.17, 6.1 and 6.2 and Corollary 7.19, we have
the following summarizing result.
Theorem 7.20. For a rooted tree T on n non-root vertices the following are equivalent:
1. Any P-model M = (T, I, P ) has an optimal SS.
2. Any C-model M = (T,C, I) has an optimal SS.
3. T is one of the following types: (i) a rooted path, (ii) a rooted star, (iii) a rooted 3-caterpillar,
or (iv) a rooted 4-spider.
Note that by (6) we have, in particular, that each α ∈ Gn preserves the order of the entries
of each x˜ ∈ Qn+, so each x˜ ∈ [p˜] has the same order of its entries as p˜ does. But clearly, the dual
operation on [x˜]∗ = [−x˜] is order reversing, that is, we have that xi ≤ xj for any x˜ ∈ [p˜] if and only
if yi ≥ yj for any y˜ ∈ [−p˜] = [p˜]
∗. Since the optimal assignments of prizes from a given multiset
P are given in Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, we then have by Corollary 7.19 the following theorems for
C-models as well.
Theorem 7.21. Let M = (T,C, I) be a C-model where T is a rooted 3-caterpillar as in (4) and
C = {c1, . . . , cn} is a multiset of possible edge-costs indexed decreasingly c1 ≥ c2 ≥ · · · ≥ cn. Then
the SS (T, c,1), where c(ei) = ci for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is an optimal SS for M .
Theorem 7.22. Let M = (T,C, I) be a P-model, where T is a rooted 4-spider as in (5) and
C = {c1, . . . , cn} is a multiset of possible edge-costs indexed decreasingly c1 ≥ c2 ≥ · · · ≥ cn. Then
the SS (T, c,1), where c(ei) = ci for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and c(ei) = cn+k+1−i for i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} is
an optimal SS for M .
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8 Summary and Conclusions
This paper defined a cyber-security model to explore defensive security systems. The results ob-
tained mathematically support the intuition that it is best to place stronger defenses in the outer
layers and more-valuable prizes in the deeper layers. We defined three types of SSs: improved,
good, and optimal. We showed that it is not always possible to find an optimal SS for a given
CSM, but demonstrated for rooted paths and stars that optimal SSs do exist. The results mathe-
matically show that a path produces the best cyber-security, however, burying something n levels
deep for large n may prevent the friendly side from accessing the “information” effectively. The
results show, in general, that trees having greater depth provide more security in this setting.
We showed the any CSM is equivalent to a CSM where either all the edge penetration costs are
unit priced (a P-model) or where all the vertices have a unit prize (C-model), by allowing larger
underlying rooted trees. We then characterised for which trees a P-model has an optimal SSs, and
we also did that for the C-models. We noted that the P- and C-models have optimal SSs for exactly
the same types of rooted trees. This was then explained by obtaining a duality between the P- and
C-models in the penultimate section of the paper.
We gave an O(n log n) algorithm for producing a good SS that was based on sorting. It is not
clear how strong such a good SS is, as there may be many such good SSs, and some may be better
than others. It would be interesting to come up with a comparison metric to rank various good SSs.
We must continue to explore models of cyber-security systems to develop the foundations needed
to combat the ongoing and increasing number of cyber attacks. This work is but one step in that
direction.
We conclude the paper with a number of questions.
1. Can we find an efficient algorithm to develop optimal SSs in the cases where all penetration
costs or all targets are from a finite set of possible values? Say, if we have two possible
penetrations costs or three? Similarly for prizes?
2. In a two-player version of the model, what would be the best strategy for a defender who is
allowed to reposition a prize or a portion of a prize after each move by an attacker? And,
what would the complexity of this problem be?
3. Are there on-line variants of the model that are interesting to study? For example, a version
where the topology of the tree changes dynamically or where only a partial description is
known to the attacker.
4. Could a dynamic programming approach be used to obtain a SS that were somehow quan-
tifiably better than a good SS or allow us to pick the “best” good SS?
5. Is there a more-useful definition of neighboring configuration that could lead to an efficient
algorithm for producing better SSs, for example, perhaps a definition where sibling vertices
or edges can have their prizes or penetration costs swapped, respectively?
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